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to which the State is a party, are binding and enforceable by law, and any provision included in the contract excluding the parties from resorting to the courts, renders it invalid." (*Russian Information and Review*, April 1, 1922, page 311).

These terms of ordinary guaranty of rights of foreigners within Russia have been found so satisfactory to fourteen countries that they now have full diplomatic missions in Russia; five have trade delegations with quasi-diplomatic functions; two have special missions—this as of December 1, 1921. Why are they not satisfactory to us?

AMERICA'S RESPONSIBILITY

I have tried to suggest that not only does prosperity in Europe depend upon Russia, but peace also. I believe that many of the financial claims of European nations upon Russia are just, and I know that Russia is ready to liquidate them. I believe, also, that many claims of Russia against the Western powers for damages caused by invasions of Russia, provoked and financed by those powers, are as just as was ever our own "Alabama" claim against Great Britain. All of these matters could and would be adjusted readily enough, were anyone certain

that their adjustment would be followed by a new era of production and prosperity in all of Europe, including Russia. But that depends upon us, in this country, who hold the key to the credit essential to any resumption of industry in Russia, and so in Europe, generally. None, it is true, can force us to recognize Russia, or to lend Russia the tools of economic regeneration. But if we do not, if we stand aside, all Europe is more than likely to rush to a ruin in which we cannot be unconcerned.

I can best close, I think, by quoting Dr. R. Estcourt, in *The Annalist* of May 1, 1922—a journal published by the *New York Times*, and scarcely to be termed radical. He says:

Compromise is essential all around. What we have to recognize is that there is a *de facto* and a *de jure* government in Russia that has stood up against all comers for nearly five years, while the law of nations requires such conditions to exist for only two years in order to command diplomatic relations. It is therefore a mere matter of form to certify that the existing government is as much a recognizable government as any that that country has previously had, and is slightly less despotic. Russians may have ideas as to internal matters that are different from those we cherish, but is there any country in the world governed precisely like another?

What Can Be Done for Russia?

By BARON S. A. KORFF

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THERE are many intelligent and educated Americans who fret at the imposed or seeming inactivity in the Russian question. They feel that here is a country, for which they have much sympathy, that is in need and that is

suffering, but they do not see very well how they can help. And I am sure that for a Russian the situation is even worse, for it is a terrible feeling to know that one's own countrymen are suffering and that one is seemingly unable to

help them. We must remember, too, how much has been tried—intervention, blockade and all sorts of other means, every one of which has failed—and I think we know, now, that they had to fail.

There is a second cause of anxiety, namely, the very clear idea that the world now has of the meaning of the elimination of Russia from the European markets. There can be no peace in Europe without Russia. There is everywhere a great shortage of the raw materials and foodstuffs, that Russia could furnish, and did furnish in former days.

Then, there is a third cause of alarm as to the future, and especially as to the future relations of Russia to Germany. I think the question of reparations in that respect is the simpler side of it. The moral and political aspects are much more serious; significant warning was given not so very long ago in the treaty between Germany and Russia. It has been pointed out, and I think quite rightly, that it is not the contents of the treaty that alarmed the people of Europe: it is the idea of these two countries coming together and in the wrong way. It was this realization that suddenly dawned upon the people of Europe, though probably many of them knew of the danger of a possible monarchical restoration. Let us take a step further and mention the danger of a possible vengeance on the part of a strong, resurrected Germany.

There used to be a fourth source of nervousness; many powers were very much afraid of the so-called Bolshevik poison or Bolshevik contagion. I think at present that anxiety has somewhat abated, and for several reasons: First of all, because people realized that you cannot fight that danger by force. Many have tried it, but have always failed. You

cannot fight ideas by force or bullets. Secondly, anxiety has weakened because it has been realized that the danger depends on a country's own internal conditions; a strong and healthy social body can get rid of the poison of Bolshevism just as our physical body can prevent physical disease; and then, thirdly, because most intelligent people realize that the experiment that was tried in Russia failed, and had to fail; that the system of communism as such did not work.

MANNER OF RELIEF

What then can be done for Russia? In what way can the situation be saved? I think it would be, to say the least, naïve to think that political recognition of the present Russian government can help in any way. I think that recognition alone cannot create better conditions as long as the present régime lasts. The question is, then: first, how to help Russia; secondly, how to assist the rest of Europe, and thirdly, how to avoid any German danger, if such exists. And I think that all three are very intimately connected. Russia needs Europe; Europe needs Russia, and only in coöperation can they avoid that outside danger.

You can help Russia in several ways. Of course, the simplest way is charity. You go, as Americans do, into Russia and give without ever expecting to receive anything in return. That is charity, pure and simple, and I take this opportunity to mention the wonderful piece of work the American Relief Administration has done and is doing. I have seen many men who have come out of Russia—Americans, English, French and Russians—and I can say that I did not hear one single dissenting voice. Every one of them, without exception witnesses to the

efficacy with which the work is being carried on. That is certainly a remarkable record and well appreciated on the other side. I need not mention the dimensions of the work. America goes far ahead of any others. Where America gives a million pounds England gives a little less than one hundred thousand pounds, about one-tenth of what America gives.

But it is not that way that you can save the situation. Charity is a palliative and always must remain such. It is quite another question, as to how one can assist in reëstablishing the commercial contact of Russia with the outside world. That in turn can be divided into two questions. The first is, how to get the raw materials out of Russia. I eliminate the export of foodstuffs, because I think that for a long period Russia will not be able to export foodstuffs, as she herself is starving. The second question is, how to get into Russia the industrial products, and, also, how to get in the human power, the men, the specialists, who can go in and work there.

RUSSIAN EXPORTS

At the present day something has already been done in the way of exports for a number of countries now get some amount of raw materials out of Russia. Scandinavia and especially Sweden, I suppose, would stand in the first place, for they are the nearest neighbors. They were the first to start the movement, and they get the pick of the little that Russia can give. Then come some of the Baltic States, the Succession States on the south shore of the Baltic Sea and Italy in the south, with the other Slav States on the western border and, finally, England, getting the crumbs. This latter fact is most remarkable in view of the agreement that the English have concluded

with the Bolshevik government; the results of the trade between Russia and England on the whole are very meagre and the British Foreign Office is very chary of furnishing any reliable returns or even of giving information.

Commerce to be successful always means that imports and exports in some way balance, and that is where the great difficulty of the present day comes in; such a balance does not exist. The United States, for instance, is importing from Russia without exporting. England is trying to export without importing, or importing very little. Getting the industrial products into the Russian market is very difficult. Here again I would say that Scandinavia, and especially Sweden, has the first place, because the Swedes are the nearest neighbors and because they were the first to try it. The second place is taken by Germany; already at the present date there is a very well-established contact between the two countries.

The following groups of Germans go into Russia: first, the German engineers. They are probably the most welcome and the more of them that will go to Russia, the better for both countries. Germany has a surplus that she does not need at the present moment. Why should they not go to help the Russians? The same can be said of the commercial travelers, who bring in the German goods, but who come in, however, with another idea, to prepare the markets, to study the conditions for the future. And they too, I think, must be very welcome. Let them go to Russia. It is the best scientific way of developing the Russian market. But behind them come the officials. They are less welcome, and with them comes a stream of unemployed monarchists, of whom Germany has still very many.

THE GERMAN RUSSIAN CONTACT

Dr. Simons, the Foreign Minister of Germany told the Reichstag just a year ago in April: "We must turn our faces towards the East for it is there that we shall send our surplus of intellectual and economical products." The organization for carrying out such a plan already exists.

Not long ago I had some letters from Russia and to my amazement the envelopes were stamped, "*Gepüft, Deutsche Vertretung in Russland.*" This means that the German censor has control of the correspondence that goes out from and into Russia. Now, such things are not done without any special purpose. Then too, some of Germany's cleverest men, but unfortunately of the old régime, are going into Russia, like the very well known Admiral Hintze, one of the last Foreign Secretaries of the German Empire.

We had also another warning, in a different direction. Sometime ago a Russian Liberal (Nabokoff) was shot and killed in Berlin at a public meeting, and we know now that it was the deed of the Russian reactionaries there, who are in close contact and coöperation with the German reactionaries and monarchists. If we consider that situation, I think we can say that the present German government honestly and sincerely wants to pay off its obligations. They will do their very best to meet a difficult situation, but they themselves are not very firm in the saddle, and there is the great danger. If that organization in Russia, that I mentioned, is set in motion by different forces, and if Germany can control Russia, as I personally believe she can, and get out of Russia the two things that Germany needs, food supplies and man power, would it not be possible to suppose that then,

when she feels her oats and deems herself strong again, the idea of going back at the Allies will come to the Germans? I think it would be only human and I say that then there would not be any physical power on earth to curb Germany any longer and we would see a monarchical restoration both in Germany and in Russia.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION

I must mention here in describing the present situation some indisputable facts. First, we all know that Russia has a tremendous natural wealth; that natural resources are there in great quantities and within easy reach. Secondly, that there is already going on at present a gradual regeneration; that there are already social forces moving behind the scenes, that steer the people and may bring some unexpected results and consequences. Thirdly, that the present government has been forced to make concessions to such a degree that there is nothing left of its basic principle or ideal. There is no communism any more in Russia; no trace of it is left anywhere. Capitalism, the old, despised bourgeois system and methods, has come back in full force, notwithstanding the fact that two years ago this same government was so assiduously trying to destroy and annihilate them.

Fourthly, it is also an indisputable fact that some foreign transactions are taking place at the present date. What are the different nations after? What are they looking for in Russia? In this respect in the minds of many Russians there hangs a very dark cloud. Even in the Bolshevik Press one can find reflected the dread of a coming foreign exploitation, the fear that Russia under present conditions may be turned into a helpless and exploited colony. There is no question that Russia's needs are desperate. In consequence, the con-

cession-hunters, and there are many of them, will certainly exact the most severe terms and each concession will gradually become a centre of private trading and will steadily increase for the Bolshevik government the difficulty of keeping the bulk of the foreign trade in its own hands. And here is a dangerous loophole for corruption, for misuse of power and for all sorts of other evils.

That this is realized on both sides you can judge by the following fact: all the arrangements, all the financial combinations, all the plans of the present day are being made for long terms. For instance, the plan of an international consortium that could exploit Russia was built on the basis that interests will be paid only after 1927. It is a system that is being built for the far future, not for the present moment, and that discounts any possible political changes, like the down-fall of Bolshevism.

It reminds one very much of what was happening in Turkey in the nineteenth century. That is just the way that the so-called Ottoman Debt was created, that still so heavily burdens the remainder of the former Ottoman Empire.

FOREIGN CAPITAL

It is necessary, however, to keep in mind a certain most important distinction. Not every investment that goes into a weak and destitute country necessarily means exploitation. There is a great difference, in other words, between exploitation and development, and the United States in this latter respect offers a splendid example. After the Civil War English investments began to come to America in great quantities; upwards of \$6,000,000,000 was invested in railroads, mines, factories, etc., but, notwithstanding that fact, Americans were

always managing their own affairs and gradually becoming so rich and strong that they were able to pay off that debt during the Great War. The capital was paying sometimes 10 per cent, but it was building up industries, it was educating large bodies of men to carry on these industries, it was rearing a whole generation in school and in life and it was continually opening up new sources of raw materials. In consequence, the United States only profited from these foreign investments.

But in the case of Russia, on account of her weakness, the temptations to exploit her are seemingly too great to withstand. Behind the political scenes, as at Genoa, the economic factor plays the greatest rôle; the political questions are very often, if not always, a mere camouflage. If we consider the difference between development and exploitation, as described, we will easily see why the Russians prefer American capital to any other. American capital does go abroad and foreign loans are being successfully floated. Two loans may be mentioned, one to Czechoslovakia and one to Roumania, and two more are in prospect, one to Poland and the other to Serbia.

Some companies have already large business investments in Russia and are continuing to work there. The Harvester, for instance, has never ceased to uphold its connections and is ready and prepared to renew the work there at any moment. This is the best opening, the best way out of the difficulties and, perhaps, the only way to build up in Russia a Democratic Peasant Republic. I say "Democratic" because I believe that the future government of Russia ought to be at the disposal of at least the majority of the people, if not all. The more the citizens will take part in the government, the better. I say "Peasant" because 85 per cent of the Rus-

sian population are peasants, and I think it is only fair that they should have the most to say in the government of their country. And, finally,

I say "Republic" because I think that is the only form of government that can guard us against any possible monarchical restoration.

Shell-Shocked America

By BRUCE BLIVEN

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ALL our public men who go to Europe—and nearly all of those who don't—make speeches or write articles telling what America ought to do to aid the rehabilitation of a war-wrecked world. These worthy gentlemen do not agree with one another as to details, but they are pretty well in accord as to the underlying attitude which they demand (with indignation or pathos, according to temperament) that America should assume.

They ask us to be unselfish, or at the least, selfish in the enlightened spirit which casts its bread upon the water now in the expectation that the next tide will bring it back with compound interest. They demand that we shall take a broad, intelligent view of the whole complex situation, based on a thorough understanding of the fundamental economic problems. They implore us to resume the moral leadership of all humanity which we won during the War and lost during the peace. They beseech us not to insist on the repayment of the huge sums owed us by the allies, sums which (1) cannot be paid because of the debtors' bankruptcy; (2) if they were by some miracle to be liquidated, would wreck our foreign trade, or fearfully inflate our currency or both, and (3) were spent in America by nations fighting the battle of civilization, in a struggle which was then, as afterward, quite as much ours as theirs.

The temptation to hand out advice to America is entirely irresistible; I shall yield to it myself in just a moment. However, it is perhaps just as useful at present to enquire what America *will* do, as to tell her what she ought to do. After all, Europe would be much better pleased to find out exactly what likelihood there is of aid from the United States than to hear again a list of things which would be lovely if they were done, but almost certainly will not be.

THE EXPECTED AND THE PROBABLE

I think most sober students of American politics and economics must agree with the statement that there is not one chance in a hundred that America will do the fine things she is asked to do to pull Europe out of the morass. We are urged not to be selfish, but unless all signs fail, selfish is exactly what we shall be. We are requested to put our demands upon the Old World into abeyance for a generation or so; but where is there in America the clear-visioned, broad-minded leadership which can carry through such a procedure against the indifference or the hostility of a population which, after all, partakes chiefly of the characteristics of Mr. Kipling's bandarlog?

We are invited to study and comprehend the underlying economic principles which must be followed before